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Oppenheimer: The Open Account in Texas in Light of Houston Sash.

THE OPEN ACCOUNT IN TEXAS IN LIGHT OF
HOUSTON SASH
J. DAVID OPPENHEIMER*
Creditors across Texas are faced with potential liability that
could jeopardize all of their accounts receivable. This danger was
spawned by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Houston Sash
and Door Co. v. Heaner.I The first sentence of the opinion poses the
legal question:
This is a case which presents a question of first impression whether
the charging of interest on an open account during the interest-free
period specified in Article 5069-1.03 constitutes interest in excess of
double that allowed by Article 5069-1.01, et seq., thereby subjecting
the creditor to loss of principal, twice the interest charged, all other
charges, and debtor's reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by Arti2
cle 5069-1.06(2).

An affirmative answer follows a concise statement of the facts and
summary of the law.
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Texas; Associate, Oppenheimer,
Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc., San Antonio, Texas.
1. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
2. Id. at 218 (footnote omitted); see TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01, 1.03,
1.06(2) (Vernon 1971). Article 5069-1.03 provides that in the absence of an agreement for
interest between the parties, interest is allowed at a rate of six percent per annum on all open
accounts from the first day of January after the charges on the account are made. Id. art.
5069-1.03. The "interest-free" period referred to by the court is thus the period between the
time when the open account sale is made, and the first of January that follows. See Houston
Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex. 1979). Article 5069-1.06(2) provides
for a forfeiture of twice the interest contracted for, charged, or received; all principal, interest,
and other charges; and reasonable attorney's fees in cases in which the interest exacted
exceeds twice the allowable rate. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
Both of these statutes were amended by the legislature in 1979. Although subsection two of
article 5069-1.06 was not changed, the amendment to subsection one alters the penalty for
double usury. Effective August 27, 1979, the penalty for double usury will be a forfeiture of
three times the amount that the interest exacted exceeds the allowable rate, all principal,
interest and other charges, and reasonable attorney's fees. The penalty applies to all transactions except those pending in litigation on the effective date of the act. See 1979 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv., ch. 281, §§ 1-2, at 604-05 (Vernon). Article 5069-1.03 was also amended to eliminate the prohibition against charging interest on open accounts until the first of January
after the accounts are made. Under the amended statute, legal interest will be allowed on
open accounts at six percent from the thirtieth day after the account is due. See id. ch., 707,
§ 1, at 1718 (Vernon). The new statute is set out at footnote 6 infra.
3. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex. 1979). By the
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On May 31, 1973, John E. Heaner executed a letter agreement
guaranteeing payment of all sums owed Houston Sash and Door
Company by Bedford Corporation.' Shortly after Mr. Heaner executed the guaranty, Bedford commenced purchasing building supplies and materials from Houston Sash on open account. In February of 1975 Houston Sash filed suit against Bedford and Heaner to
collect debts incurred between January 15, 1974, and March 28,
1974.
At trial it was established that each invoice delivered to Bedford
stated under "TERMS OF SALE" that interest at the rate of twelve
percent per annum would be charged on all past due accounts. The
invoices also disclosed that the charges actually had been made on
the Bedford account. Since there was no agreement to pay interest
on the open account itself, the court determined that article 50691.03 was applicable.' Under that statute, which authorizes an interest rate of six percent in absence of an agreement for greater interest
between the parties, no interest charges are authorized on open
accounts until the first of January following the date that the accounts are made.'
Houston Sash conceded that it had charged interest on Bedford's
accounts prior to the January 1 following the creation of the accounts, but argued that it was not subject to loss of principal and
other penalties for charging interest in excess of double the amount
of interest allowed "by this Subtitle." 7 In a losing cause Houston
court's reasoning, since no interest is allowed on open accounts under article 5069-1.03 until
January first after the charges on the account are made, then any interest charge made during
the interest-free period constitutes a charge in excess of twice the lawful rate; "i.e. in excess
of twice zero." Id. at 221.
4. See id. at 218. Mr. Heaner was Chairman of the Board of Bedford Corporation. The
guaranty agreement, which was in writing, provided for twelve percent interest per annum.
See id. at 218.
5. See id. at 221; Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
6. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the rate of
six percent per annum shallrbe allowed on all written contracts ascertaining the sum
payable, from and after the time when the sum is due and payable; and on all open
accounts, from the first day of January after the same are made.
Id. The article, as amended by the 66th Legislature, provides:
When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the rate of
six percent per annum shall be allowed on all accounts and contracts ascertaining the
sum payable, commencing on the thirtieth (30th) day from and after the time when
the sum is due and payable.
See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 707, § 1, at 1718 (Vernon).
7. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
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Sash argued that the allowable interest referred to in article 50691.06(2) is the ten percent interest limit of article 5069-1.028 and not
the six percent limit of article 5069-1.03. The court had little difficulty dealing with this argument, finding that the article 50691.06(2) penalty for "double usury" was applicable to all of the interest rates allowed by subchapter one of the credit code Thus, the
court ruled that Bedford Corporation was entitled to an offset equal
to the amount of principal, twice the interest charged, all other
charges, and debtor's reasonable attorney's fees.'"
One of the reasons that the Houston Sash opinion is so concise
and devastating is because the creditor conceded a number of important issues that may prove pivotal in future litigation. Specifically, (1) "Houston Sash had neither pleaded nor proved that Bedford had agreed to pay interest on its open account";" (2) "Houston
Sash concedes that it charged interest on Bedford's account at a
time when it was not authorized to charge any interest";' 2 and (3)
"It is undisputed that Houston Sash charged interest on Bedford's
account during the calendar year in which it was made". 3 The court
merely determined which penalty provision applied under the posed
facts.
In obvious response to the Houston Sash opinion, the 66th Legislature passed House Bill 41 amending article 5069-1.03.11 Under the
amended statute legal interest will still be allowed on open accounts
at six percent, but the interest may begin to accrue thirty days after
8. See id. art. 5069-1.02.
9. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. 1979).
10. See id. at 221. Since Heaner was not a co-obligor on the account, but rather a
guarantor, the court found a number of distinctions between the co-defendants. First, the
written guaranty agreement, which established a rate of interest between the creditor and
guarantor, did not establish an agreed upon rate of interest between the creditor and the
primary obligor, Bedford. Thus, article 5069-1.03 was applicable between Bedford and Houston Sash, while article 5069-1.04, which establishes a maximum ten percent per annum rate
of interest for written contracts, was applicable between Heaner and Houston Sash. See id.
at 221-22. Second, since Heaner was obligated on his guaranty agreement, and not primarily
liable on the open account, the court determined that he could not interpose the usury defense
to which Bedford was entitled, and which included a complete forfeiture of principal. Finally,
since the guaranty agreement provided for twelve percent interest, Heaner was entitled to a
defensive setoff of twice the interest "contracted for" under article 5069-1.06(1), though he
remained liable for the balance of the open account. See id. at 222.
11. Id. at 219.
12. Id. at 220.
13. Id. at 221.
14. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 707, § 1, at 1718 (Vernon). The text of the amendment is set out at footnote 6 supra.
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the time that the account is due.' 5 The amendment brings the legal
rate statute more into line with commercial reality. There is no
rational basis for differentiating debtors on the basis of the time of
year in which their purchases are made. This was the precise effect
of the interest-free period under the statute prior to the amendment; a debtor purchasing on open account in January had an
eleven month interest-free debt, while an open account debt incurred in December was interest-free for only one month. Under
the new statute all open accounts are treated uniformly, and each
debt is interest-free for only thirty days after the debt is due.
The amendment, however, does not resolve all of the problems
raised by the Houston Sash opinion. Although the interest-free
period has been altered, the amended statute still provides for a
period of thirty days during which no interest is authorized." A
question arises whether a court, under the reasoning set out in
Houston Sash, will interpret the statute to absolutely prohibit
interest charges during the thirty-day interest-free period. If the
statute were to be construed, then, as in Houston Sash, any interest
charges during the interest-free period would constitute double
usury with the accompanying forfeiture of principal. The statute
could be construed, on the other hand, so that any interest charges
during the interest-free period merely increase the interest exacted
during the period in which interest is allowed. It is questionable,
however, whether this construction will be forthcoming in light of
the Houston Sash opinion. 7
The effective date of the amendment to article 5069-1.03 is August 27, 1979.11 The amendment makes no reference to whether it
15. See id.
16. See id. Interestingly, the amendment also alters the legal rate applicable to contracts
that do not provide for a rate of interest. The word "written" was deleted from the statute,
although the contract still must be one "ascertaining the sum payable." Presumably, as with
an open account, the creditors' records will be the means by which the sum payable is ascertained. Furthermore, the amendment imposes a thirty-day interest-free period from the
date that the contract debt is due, while the statute as it existed prior to the amendment
allowed interest to accrue from the date that the debt was due and payable. See TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971); 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 707, § 1, at 1718
(Vernon).
17. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. 1979). The
court's words could be easily applied to the new statute. "The Article clearly permits no
interest on open accounts" for thirty days after the time when the debt is due. See id. at 221.
The court also stated in the course of its opinion, however, that cases interpreting statutes
that have been replaced are of little value in interpreting the replacement. See id. at 220.
18. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 707, § 2, at 1718 (Vernon).
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will be retroactive to encompass accounts in existence prior to its
effective date." Thus the general rule that a transaction is to be
tested for usury according to the law in existence at the time of the
transaction 0 will probably control the accounts and interest charges
made prior to the effective date of the new statute." Since the
statute of limitations for usury actions is four years,2 the effect of
the holding in Houston Sash will probably be felt for quite some
time.
Creditors in future litigation will avoid the. harsh result of
Houston Sash if they can establish that the debtor agreed to pay
interest. If there is an agreement for interest, the creditor is entitled
to collect more than six percent per annum, ' 3 and more importantly
for those in the position of Houston Sash and Door Company, the
interest accrues from the date of the agreement rather than from the
following January. Thus there would be no hiatus during which any
interest charges would constitute "double usury." Under the Texas
Business and Commerce Code an agreement is defined as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage
2' 4
of trade.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724,
731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974);
Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ);
Seymour Opera-House Co. v. Thurston, 45 S.W. 815, 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref'd).
21. "A statute should not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required
by explicit language or by necessary construction." Alvarado v. Gonzales, 552 S.W.2d 539,
542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); see, e.g., Government Personnel Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 151 Tex. 454, 461, 251 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1952); National Carloading
Corp. v. Phoenix-El Paso Express, Inc., 142 Tex. 141, 148, 176 S.W.2d 564, 568 (1943); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
22. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (3) (Vernon 1971).
23. By agreement, the creditor may charge up to ten percent interest per annum. See
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971). Additionally, for amounts over five
thousand dollars, corporations may agree to pay up to one and one-half percent per month
interest. See id. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978). Although a charge of one, or one
and one-half percent interest per month may give rise to a penalty for usury, the interest
charges will not, unless compounded, exceed twice the maximum rate and would thus not
give rise to a forfeiture of principal. See id. art. 5069-1.06 (1) (Vernon 1971). Furthermore,
the penalty for simple usury was reduced by the legislature in 1979 and goes into effect on
August 27, 1979. Under the amended statute, the penalty will be only three times the amount
that the interest exacted exceeds the allowable rate. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281,
§ 1, at 604-05 (Vernon).
24. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201 (3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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As was the case in Houston Sash many sales on an open account
are between merchants. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes
the special nature of tranisactions between merchants. As adopted
in Texas, section 2.2075 reads as follows:
(a) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(b) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part
of the contract unless:
(1) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(2) they materially alter it; or
(3) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(c) Conduct by both parties which recognized the existence of
a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
cases the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision of this Act.2"
Does an invoice constitute an expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is delivered to the debtor? Arguably a provision
on the invoice providing for interest on all past due accounts may
be different from the original offered or agreed terms. But as set
forth in paragraph (b)(2) of section 2.207, between merchants the
imposition of an interest charge becomes a part of the contract
because it is not a material alteration of the bargain.27
Debtors will claim that the punitive nature of the usury provisions
of the credit code indicate that imposing an interest charge is a
material alteration of the bargain. Official comment 5 to section
2.207 is helpful on this point. "Examples of clauses which involve
no element of unreasonable surprise and which therefore are to be
incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is seasonably
given are: . . . a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices
or fixing the seller's standard credit terms where they are within the
25. Id.§ 2.207.
26. Id. § 2.207.
27. Id. § 2.207(b)(2).
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range of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for
"28

Attorneys representing creditors must remember that the Texas
Business and Commerce Code recognizes trade practices and course
of performance. For example, section 2.208(a)2 1 states:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance
and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement. 0
Thus, if the debtor previously paid interest, the debtor may have
acquiesced or ratified the interest charge. This legal argument
should be followed with equitable arguments of estoppel.'
Establishing trade practice will not be difficult in light of the
number of creditors using invoices similar to those used by Houston
Sash and Door Company. In this regard a creditor that finds itself
in the same situation as Houston Sash should request the production of the invoice forms used by its adversary in billing its customers. Presumably many of those invoices are as offensive as the creditor's forms.
28. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207, comment 5 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Clauses
providing for interest on an overdue debt should not be viewed as a material alteration since

the creditor would be entitled to interest if he was forced to reduce his claim to a judgment.
Prejudgment interest "is recoverable as a matter of right where an ascertainable sum of

money is determined to have been due at a date certain prior to judgment." Republic Nat'l
Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 116 (Tex. 1978). Prejudgment interest may
be awarded based on the "legal interest" statute, article 5069-1.03, or, at the court's discretion, on equitable principles. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d
480, 485 (Tex. 1978); Larcon Petroleum, Inc. v. Autotronic Systems, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 873,
879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ). Postjudgment interest is set at
nine percent per annum, unless the cause of action is based upon a transaction involving a
greater rate. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
29. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.208(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).

30. Id.
31. It is important to remember that merely agreeing to an interest charge is not the
same as agreeing to the rate of interest. Article 5069-1.03 is applicable "when no specified
rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties." TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03
(Vernon 1971) (emphasis added). Thus, a mere agreement to pay interest, without specifying
the rate, may give rise to the application of article 5069-1.03. Id; see Autocredit of Forth
Worth v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ dism'd).
While it is true that there should be a contract to pay usurious interest, such contract
may be oral or by acquiescence. . . . The fact that appellant knowingly requested that
appellee pay the excessive sum found by the jury and that appellee complied with such
request is sufficient evidence to establish a contract and acquiescence therein between
the parties to collect and pay usurious interest.
Id. at 953.
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Two early Texas Supreme Court decisions deal with attempts to
prove agreements to pay interest although no writing indicated such
a promise. In Adriance v. Brooks3 2 the court ruled that a contract
to pay interest will not be inferred from previous dealings of the
parties that had called for interest. Any contract, either oral or
written, would be enforced, "[blut we will not go farther, and
scrutinize the acts of the parties, to judge whether an implied obligation to pay interest, as an instant of the debt, has been created.""
This opinion makes a strong case against reliance on prior course of
dealing, but the case is of limited use under the mandate of the
.Texas Business and Commerce Code.34
In contrast to Adriance, the supreme court looked beyond the
contract in Pridgen v. Hill 5 and found that the plaintiff's evidence
of a contract to pay interest was sufficient to support a verdict in
his favor."8 In this case, however, the facts were overwhelmingly in
the plaintiff's favor. The defendant admitted in interrogatories that
the account was correct, that he was in the habit of paying interest
at the rate of eight percent per annum on his accounts with the
plaintiff, and that he expected to pay the same amount on current
37
accounts.
An extensive body of law concerning the existence of written contracts based on invoices exists under the exceptions to the general
venue rule. 31 Most of the cases deal with the same issue-whether
"confirmatory memoranda" are contracts in writing within article
1995. 31 A recent example is found in N.K. Parrish,Inc. v. Navar,10
when the court of civil appeals determined that the confirmatory
32. 13 Tex. 279 (1855).
33. Id. at 284-85.
34. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.207, 2.208 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See
notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, although the Adriance court states
that a contract for interest will not be implied from prior contracts, it does not state that
additional terms to the contract in question cannot be raised by the acts of the parties. See
Adriance v. Brooks, 13 Tex. 279, 284-85 (1855).
35. 12 Tex. 374 (1854).
36. Id. at 379.
37. Id. at 379.
38. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (5)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
39. See, e.g., Macpet v. Oil Field Maintenance Co., 538 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Public Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Corpus, 494 S.W.2d 200,
203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ); Harrison v. Facade, Inc., 355 S.W.2d 543, 545-46
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ).
40. 555 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
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memoranda are a part of the litigant's contract, even if never signed
or executed.4 ' If the parties have actually come to terms prior to the
"confirmations," then the subsequent memoranda cannot enlarge
the agreement. But when the debtor agrees to subsequent finalization of the agreement expressly or by prior custom, the confirmatory
memoranda may become part of the contract." The Parrishopinion
also recognizes that a debtor may acquiesce to additional terms in
later writings, and that such acquiescence becomes a part of the
agreement. 3 In future litigation involving facts similar to Houston
Sash, acquiescence may prove to be a significant argument by
creditors.
When the supreme court stated: "It is undisputed that Houston
Sash charged interest on Bedford's account during the calendar year
in which it was made,"" another important question was overlooked. Why did the court assume that the account was created in
the same year in which the interest accrued? According to the opinion, Bedford's debt was established between January 15, 1974, and
March 28, 1974." 5 But Mr. Heaner executed his guaranty agreement
on May 31, 1973, and logically that corresponded to the date Bedford formalized its arrangement with Houston Sash. If Houston
Sash had established that the account was created in May of 1973
rather than 1974, the decision may have been different.
If the "account" is created for the purposes of article 5069-1.03
when the parties first strike a bargain, potentially difficult arithmetic problems are avoided.4" What if the debt in Houston Sash was
incurred between May 31, 1973, and March 28, 1974? Based on the
court's reasoning the transaction would continue to be usurious, but
41. See id. at 218.
42. See id. at 218.
43. See id. at 218.
44. See Houston Sash & Door v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. 1979).
45. See id. at 218-19.
46. Difficulties may arise, for example, in cases in which the debtor has purchased items
on account during two or more consecutive years. If interest has been charged on the account
in both years, then all of the principal would be subject to forfeiture. If interest is charged
on both years' principal during the second year only, this also is a charge of twice the
allowable interest with the consequent forfeiture of principal, although interest could legally
be charged at six percent on the first year's principal. In this case, the courts apparently
would be required to distinguish between the legal portion of the interest charges and the
usurious portion, and only that principal upon which usurious interest charges were made
would be forfeited. See id. at 220-21; Tax. Rav. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03, 1.06(2) (Vernon
1971).
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interest at the rate of six percent per annum would accrue on that
portion of the debt created prior to January 1, 1974.11
Carrying this analogy one step further, what advice can an attorney give his client concerning compliance with article 5069-1.03.
Creditors appear to be required to differentiate between purchases
made in the current calendar year versus prior years, and interest
charges may accrue only on purchases in prior years. Additional
problems are created when a customer makes a partial payment. It
appears inequitable for the creditor to apply payments to this year's
purchases rather than to earlier purchases; however, this procedure
is the only system that insures legal interest charges48 on those accounts not covered by the amendment to article 5069-1.03.
Equally perplexing are the problems created if interest is charged
on this year's purchases as well as prior purchases. Does the creditor
forfeit just the principal amount created in the current year, or does
the creditor lose the entire principal reflected on the "account"?
Similarly, how much interest charge is deemed usurious in this
situation? Should a duty be imposed on creditors to maintain two
ledgers on each customer, one reflecting purchases in prior years,
and the second reflecting purchases during the current year? Not
only would this work an undue hardship on creditors, but trial
courts would find great difficulty when required to make these calculations.
All of these problems are avoided if an "account" is created only
once-at the inception of the relationship between the parties. The
logic of this approach is hampered, however, by court opinions containing language implying that a new account is created when each
debt accrues." In Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe and Supply the
supreme court stated: "Where there is no agreement upon interest
rate. . . the statutory 6% interest from January 1 following the date
the debt is incurred is 'read into' the agreement by article 50691.03. "1'
Article 5069-1.03 presented the Waco Court of Civil Appeals with
47. See Houston Sash & Door, Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 220-21 (Tex. 1979); TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
48. But see Watson v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 35, (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (payments applied by court to prior year's purchases); 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.,
ch. 707, § 1, at 1718 (Vernon).
49. See Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 n.2 (Tex. 1977);
Watson v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 547 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1977).
51. Id. at 261 n.2 (emphasis added).
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an interesting problem. In Watson v. Cargill, Inc." the court ruled
that the seller of goods charged interest prior to the time set forth
in article 5069-1.03. 51 In this particular case the "interest" took the
form of a "delinquency charge" reflected on a written invoice. None
of the interest was collected, but the court accessed the full penalty
of article 5069-1.06 because the interest was "charged." 54 The majority, opinion relied on Windhorst in reaching its decision. 5 In
Windhorst the supreme court held that article 5069-1.06 applied
when unauthorized interest is contracted for, charged, or collected."
Houston Sash and Door Company filed a petition alleging a debt
that included not only the sums charged for goods sold to Bedford,
but also the interest previously charged and recorded on invoices.
Consequently, the court did not consider whether or not the terms
of the sale on the invoice constitutes a "charge" under article 50691.01. A court of civil appeals opinion in Thomas Conveyor Co. v.
Portec, Inc. " recognized an important aspect of trade practice. That
court held that interest is not "charged" merely because of an invoice provision when the creditor took no other action to collect the
interest.5 8
Faced with a problem in allocating payments, the majority of the
court in Watson believed that payments should be applied to the
oldest accounts first in order to reduce the pre-January 1 account
balance upon which statutory interest could be charged." A pursuasive dissenting opinion preferred to analysis of the entire relationship of the parties, instead of a consideration of the individual
charges and credits on the account. 0 The total unpaid balance after
the applicable January 1 remained larger than the balance as of
52. 573 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. See id. at 42.
54. See id. at 42.
55. See id. at 42; Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977).
56. See Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977).
57. 572 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
58. See id. at 363; Killebrew v. Bartlett, 568 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1978, no writ).
59. See Watson v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). The majority based its opinion on the settled rule that "where there is a running
account with various items of charges and credit occurring at different times, and no direction
of payment has been made by the debtor, payments on the account as a whole are applied
by law to the oldest unpaid portion of the account." Id. at 39; Prowell v. Berry-Barnett
Grocery Co., 462 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd).
60. See Watson v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 35, 42-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (dissenting opinion).
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January 1, and the dissent believed that it would be acceptable to
charge interest after January 1 on the entire amount unpaid as of
that date." The dissent in Watson poses a more accurate view of
accounts on the books of most creditors. January 1 may be an important date under the law, but it has no reasonable relationship to
the purchase and sale of goods. Further, the majority opinion in
Watson ignores the plights of the creditor who has extended credit
to a customer but who is unable to collect any interest on the extension of credit until the following January."
Fortunately, this disparity of application and many of the computation difficulties have been remedied by the 1979 amendment to
the legal interest statute. 3 Although the amendment retains an
interest-free period of thirty days, the creditor will be able to impose
interest charges on each item of the account thirty days after it is
due, and on the entire account thirty days after the last item is due.
The newly amended penalty statute defines usurious interest as
interest in excess of that authorized by law, and calls for a forfeiture
of only three times the excess." Since, under Watson v. Cargill,
Inc.'" each item on an open account constitutes a separate transaction, then an interest charge on an account containing items for
which legal interest is authorized as well as items that are still
interest-free should not call for a forfeiture of the entire principal,
nor a penalty for the authorized portion of the interest charge.66
Another alternative available to creditors faced with liability similar to the forfeitures that Houston Sash suffered is to challenge the
nature of the transaction. An open account, as used in the Texas
statutes, is an unliquidated account based on sales creating the
relationship of debtor and creditor by course of dealing. The term
excludes isolated special contracts, and the term does not apply to
accounts created for services rendered. 7 If the transaction in question does not constitute an open account, then although there is no
61. See id. at 43 (dissenting opinion).
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
63. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 707, § 1, at 1718 (Vernon).
64. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604 (Vernon).
65. 573 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. See Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971); 1979 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604 (Vernon).
67. See Meaders v. Biskamp, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. 1958); McDaniel v. National
Steam Laundry Co., 112 Tex. 54, 58, 244 S.W.135, 137 (1922); Routon v. Phillips, 246 S.W.2d
223, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

62. See TEx.
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agreement for interest, the Houston Sash problem would not arise
since there would be no interest-free period. Instead, the creditor
would be entitled to six percent interest per annum from the time
that the debt is due and payable. 8
Another tactic not to be ignored by creditors is to shift the burden
to the debtor to show that an agreement does not exist. In Miles v.
W C. Roberts Lumber Co." the court held that the debtor had the
burden of proving the absence of an agreement between the parties. 0 In Miles the debtor failed to request or submit an issue concerning the presence of an agreement in the trial court. Since the
evidence did not conclusively establish that there was no agreement, that issue, as well as the debtor's recovery under article 50691.03, was waived." In Houston Sash the supreme court stated that
the creditor had failed to plead or prove an agreement, and consequently the court assumed that no agreement existed. 2 The evidence in that case was far from conclusive on whether or not an
agreement existed between the parties. The invoices called for interest on overdue accounts, and Mr. Heaner, who was closely associated with Bedford, had signed a separate guaranty agreement.7 3
Whether or not an open account exists is an important consideration when dealing with possible usurious interest, but in a broader
sense the significance of the term wains. For example, a sale on an
open account must create some form of contract or there would be
no requirement for payment on the part of the recipient. Once a
contract is established it may not be difficult to determine that one
of the terms of the contract requires the payment of interest. If this
position has any merit, as between merchants the only occasion on
which interest from the date of the "account" would not accrue
would be those when no writing or invoice is prepared or when the
invoice or writing makes no reference to interest charges.
Failing to treat an open account in the proper manner may create
unanticipated problems under the Statute of Frauds. Section
2.201(1) 7' of the UCC provides:
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
561 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See id. at 258.
See id. at 258.
See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. 1979).
See id. at 218-19.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500.00 or more is nct enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate
that a contractfor sale has been made between the parties and signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker . . ..
Section 2.201(2) provides an exception between merchants if within
a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract is received.7 If a standard invoice is not sufficient confirmation of a
contract, then the Statute of Frauds will preclude the enforcement
of more contracts than I care to imagine.
On first reading, the supreme court's opinion in Houston Sash
appears to resolve the issue of interest on an open account. On
reflection, however, it is apparent that courts facing similar facts
will be called-upon to interpret and rule on questions not raised in
the earlier opinion. The new amendment to article 5069-1.03 will
unquestionably aid the open account creditor by allowing him to
charge interest much sooner than he could under the prior statute.
Nevertheless, creditors would be wise to review and revise their open
account practices, since there is still no statutory authorization for
interest charges in excess of six percent per annum in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. § 2.201(2).
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